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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20040972-CA
vs.
MARK WORKMAN,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in its denial of Workman's motion to dismiss or

quash bindover on grounds of improper venue? This issue presents a question of law that
is reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). See also State
v. Green, 2005 UT 9, 108 P.3d 710; State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977). This
issue was preserved in a written motion to dismiss or quash bindover (R. 65-73).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Mark D. Workman appeals from the October 14, 2004, judgment, sentence, and

commitment of the Fourth District Court after he entered a conditional plea to theft of
stolen property, a class A misdemeanor.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Mark D. Workman was charged by Information filed in Fourth Judicial District

Court on February 24, 2000, of theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-408 (R. 3).
On March 6, 2003, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Fred D.
Howard. The State proffered the testimony of Rebecca Roberts and called Detective
Todd Mallinson to testify. The trial court found probable cause and bound the matter
over for trial. (R. 57).
On April 14, 2003, Workman filed a Motion to Dismiss for Improper Venue or in
the alternative Motion to Quash Bindover Order. (R. 65-73). On April 18, 2003, the State
filed a Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Quash Bindover. (R 74-84). On
May 8, 2003, a motion hearing was held before the Honorable Fred D. Howard. The
court took the motion under advisement. (R. 88).
On May 21, 2003, Judge Howard issued a written ruling denying Workman's
motion (R. 90). The trial court specifically concluded as follows: "Noting the facts
relative to the incident in question and submitted authorities; the Court is persuaded by
Plaintiffs arguments and authorities which the Court adopts and incorporates in this
Ruling. Defendant's Motions, therefore, are respectfully denied" (R. 90).
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On December 4, 2003, Workman, through his attorney, gave notice of his intent to
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals the decision by the court against Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss for Improper Venue, signed by the court on May 4, 2003 (R. 147). On June
22, 2004, the Utah Court of Appeals filed an Order of Dismissal (Case No. 20030992CA) for failure of Appellant to file the attachments to the docketing statement (R. 157).
On October 14, 2004, entered a "no-contest" plea to theft by receiving, a class A
misdemeanor, conditioned upon his right to appeal the denial of his motion to
dismiss/motion to quash the bindover (R. 166-169, 170-73). At this time, Workman was
also sentenced to 36 months probation, 7 days work diversion in the Utah County Jail,
and he was ordered to pay a $525.00 fine and restitution of $2000.00 (R. 175-77).
However, the trial court stayed the sentencing order, pursuant to the parties' agreement,
until after this appeal (R. 200: 11).
On November 9, 2004, Workman filed a notice of appeal in Fourth District Court
(R. 182).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
A.

Proffered Testimony of Rebecca Roberts
On December 13, 1999, at about 8:00 a.m., Roberts' 1998 Mitsubishi Mirage was

stolen from in front of her house in the Salt Lake County area. Roberts reported the theft
to the police on that day. (R. 196:6).
The value of the vehicle, new, was $14,500 and on the date of the theft of the
vehicle on December 13, her insurance company valued the vehicle at $9,282. (R. 196:6).
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Roberts does not know the defendant, did not give him permission to have the
vehicle at any time, and did not give permission for anyone to take the vehicle from her
home on the morning of December 13, 1999. (R. 196:6).

B.

Testimony of Detective Todd Mallinson
Detective Todd Mallinson has been employed by the Orem Police Department for

about 12 years. (R. 196:7). Mallinson worked in the Major Crimes Task Force from
September of 1999 to December of 2002. (R. 196:8).
Mallinson was on duty January 7, 2000. (R. 196:8). He was on routine patrol in
the area of 1200 West and Center in Orem when he observed a female on the pay phone.
"She appeared to be very nervous and quick movement, looking around, just acting
suspicious." (R. 196:8). Mallinson set up surveillance across the street to watch when she
left(R. 196:8).
When the female left, she got into a black Mitsubishi Mirage. (R. 196:9).
Mallinson began following her when she pulled out. The driver made a wide turn, going
through several lanes of traffic onto Center Street and entering the 1-15 freeway. The
driver proceeded southbound. Mallinson followed her in the slow lane. The driver
crossed over the fog line several times and exited the freeway at the 12th South exit in
Orem.(R. 196:9).
The erratic driving behavior caused Mallinson to be concerned that the driver was
intoxicated or under the influence of narcotics. This concern led him to initiate a traffic
stop. (R. 196:9).
The driver exited the freeway at 12th South and proceeded to get right back on the
southbound 1-15 freeway. The driver pulled over just after the on ramp. (R. 196:9).
4

Mallinson was in an unmarked car. (R. 196:9). His red and blue lights were in the
headlights. (R. 196:10).
During the stop, the driver identified herself as Holly Armstrong. She did not have
a driver's license. She could not provide Mallinson with the vehicle registration or proof
of insurance. (R. 196: 10). Mallinson indicated to Armstrong that he had run the
registration on the vehicle, and there was some concern because the vehicle was not
registered in her name. (R. 196: 10).
Mallinson returned to his vehicle and ran routine checks on Armstrong and the
vehicle. (R. 196: 10). Dispatch confirmed the vehicle was stolen and listed on NCIC. (R.
196: 10). When Mallinson received this information, he went up to the vehicle, had
Armstrong exit the vehicle, and placed her under arrest for possession of a stolen vehicle.
(R. 196: 11).
Armstrong was informed of Miranda rights. Armstrong waived her rights and
stated that she would speak to Mallinson. (R. 196: 11). Armstrong said she received the
vehicle from an individual by the name of Mark, and she told Mallinson she did not know
his last name. Later Armstrong told Mallinson that she thought the name was Mark
Workman. (R. 196: 12).
Mallinson asked Armstrong if she had a phone number for Workman so that he
could contact him to verify the story. Mallinson used his cell phone to call Workman and
spoke to him about the case. (R. 196: 12). At the time of the phone call, Mallinson
believed that Workman was at his residence at 1044 Quail Park Drive in Murray;
however, he was not sure that Workman was actually in that location. (R. 196: 14).
Mallinson testified that the phone rang and an individual, a male, answered the
phone and when Mallinson asked to speak to Mark Workman the caller said he was Mark
5

Workman. (R. 196: 13). Mallinson then asked him if he knew a Holly Armstrong and
Workman said yes, that he had been friends with Armstrong for three or four months.
Mallinson then asked him if he had loaned her a vehicle, the black Mitsubishi Mirage,
and Workman said yes he had loaned it to her earlier that day, about five o'clock, in Salt
Lake City. (R. 196: 13). Mallinson then asked Workman if he knew the vehicle was
stolen. Workman said, no, he did not know the vehicle was stolen. Mallinson asked
Workman where he obtained the vehicle from, and Workman said he obtained the vehicle
from an individual by the name of Travis. Mallinson asked if Workman knew Travis's
last name, and Workman said he believed it started with an M. Workman then proceeded
to tell Mallinson that the name that he purchased the vehicle from was on the title, which
was in the glove box of the car. (R. 196: 14).
Mallinson found the title in the glove box. (R. 196: 15). The name on the title was
Travis Daddow. The title was for a 1979 Volkswagen. The title showed the address of
the registered owner as 8915 West 2800 South, No. 3 in Magna. (R. 196: 16). When
Mallinson found the title, he further questioned Workman. (R. 196: 16).
Mallinson told Workman the title was for a Volkswagen. Workman responded by
saying that he had not got around to looking at the title close. Mallinson then told
Workman that if he had purchased a vehicle, he would make sure that the title was to the
vehicle that he was purchasing. (R. 196: 16). Workman made no response. Mallinson
asked Workman how much he paid for the vehicle, and he told him he had paid a total of
$3,600 for the vehicle. Workman said he put $900 down and he still owed the remainder.
(R. 196: 18). When Mallinson asked Workman how he could get in touch with Travis,
Workman said he did not know, that he believed Travis was in either prison or in jail. (R.
196: 18).
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At that point, Mallinson felt that Workman was being evasive and that he did not
want to answer any more questions. (R. 196: 16). Workman did not say he would not
answer any more questions, rather Mallinson could just tell by Workman's demeanor. (R.
196: 16). When Mallinson first called Workman, he identified himself only as Todd
when Workman asked who he was. (R. 196: 17). At that time, he spoke freely. Then
about the middle of the conversation, when they started talking specifically about the
vehicle, and that it was stolen, Workman asked again who Mallinson was. Mallinson told
him he was Detective Todd Mallinson from Utah County Major Crimes, and that is when
Mallinson felt like Workman was being a little evasive. (R. 196: 17).
Mallinson asked no further questions and Workman made no further comments.
The conversation ended with Mallinson telling Workman that if he needed to talk to him
further, he would call him back. (R. 196: 17). Workman indicated that would be okay.
(R. 196: 17).
Mallinson then transported the vehicle to the Pleasant Grove Police Department to
do an inventory of the vehicle. Armstrong was transported to the police department
where she was held temporarily until she was transported to the Utah County Jail. (R.
196: 17).
Under cross-examination, Detective Mallinson testified that in speaking with
Armstrong, he determined that she had picked up the car from Workman at his residence
in Salt Lake County. (R. 196: 18). Armstrong also told Mallinson that she had picked the
car up on the 6th of January at about five o'clock then she had made a few stops and gone
to a party. Armstrong also told Mallinson that when he had first observed her on the
phone, she was calling Workman because she wanted to keep the car and did not want to
go back to Salt Lake. (R. 196: 19).
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Workman asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss or in
the alternative to quash bindover for improper venue in that he did not have control or
constructive possession of the vehicle in Utah County. Alternatively, Workman also
asserts that the trial court erred in denying the motion because the testimony presented
shows that every element of the crime charged occurred in Salt Lake County.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING WORKMAN'S MOTION TO
DISMISS OR QUASH BINDOVER FOR IMPROPER VENUE
Workman asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss or in
the alternative to quash bindover for improper venue in this matter when testimony
showed that he did not have control or constructive possession of the vehicle in Utah
County. Alternatively, Workman also asserts that the trial court erred in denying the
motion because the testimony presented showed that every element of the crime charged
occurred in Salt Lake County.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution that criminal defendants
"shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been
previously ascertained by law[.]" Further, Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution
provides that the Defendant shall "have a speedy public trail by an impartial jury of the
county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed[.]"
In support of these constitutional guarantees, Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-202
provides certain rules of venue. Subsection 76-l-202(l)(b) provides that when elements
8

of the offense occur in more than one county, the trial may be held in either county. The
rule of statutory construction is that a specific provision of law takes precedent over more
general provisions. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Board of State Lands and
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah 1992). Consequently, subsection 76-1-202(1 )(g)(iii) is
more specific to the crime of theft and must take precedence over subsection (l)(b).
Subsection (l)(g)(iii) provides that "[a] person who commits theft may be tried in any
county in which he exerts control over the property affected."

A.

Workman did not have control of the vehicle in Utah County.
Workman asserts that he relinquished control of the vehicle in Salt Lake County

when he loaned the car to Armstrong. (R. 196: 13). Workman asserts that he disposed of
the car through a bailment that was established when the possession and control of the car
passed from him to Armstrong. McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302, 304 (Utah 1992).
Further, this bailment occurred in Salt Lake County.
In McPherson v. Belnap, 830 P.2d 302 (Utah 1992), former condominium lessees
sued the lessor to recover for the loss of their personal property that was stored at the
condominium. After being asked to leave the premises on short notice, an agreement was
arranged that the McPhersons would leave their furniture at the condominium until they
found a permanent place to store it. Belnap assured the McPhersons the property would
be safe. After vacating the property, the McPhersons had no key or other access to their
furniture except through Belnap.
The court in McPherson held that "the creation of a bailment requires that
possession and control over an object pass from the bailor to the bailee." Id at 304. The
court further held that "the bailor must actually or constructively deliver the properly to
9

the bailee in such a way as to entitle the bailee to exclude others from possession during
the bailment period, including the owner/bailor." The court clarified this holding by
stating, "This does not mean that to be a bailment, the bailee must be the only one who
has access to the property. The bailee may allow others to access the property without
destroying the bailment. The requirement is only that the bailee has the right to exclude
all persons not covered by the agreement and to control the property.'' McPherson, 830
P.2dat305.
Workman asserts that he created a bailor/bailee relationship with Armstrong when
he actually delivered the property to her and turned possession and control of the vehicle
over to her. The facts show that Workman did not control where Armstrong was going,
how she would get there, or agreeing that she could remain there. After leaving
Workman, Armstrong told the officer she made a few stops and then attended a party.
Armstrong also told Mallinson that when he had first observed her on the phone, she was
calling Workman because she wanted to keep the car and did not want to go back to Salt
Lake.(R. 196: 19).

B.

Workman did not have constructive possession of the vehicle in Utah County.
Workman asserts that he did not have constructive possession of the car in Utah

County. In State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79, 985 P.2d 911, Layman was convicted of the
offenses of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and possession
of paraphernalia. There was no evidence showing that Layman had actual possession of
either the methamphetamine or the paraphernalia in the pouch carried by a passenger in
the vehicle; therefore, the only basis for the conviction could have been that Layman was
in constructive possession of the passenger's pouch and its contents. The question was
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whether Layman had sufficient control over another person to prove constructive
possession of something that person had in her physical possession.
In State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985), Fox was charged and convicted of
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to distribute after discovering
marijuana plants growing in a greenhouse attached to defendant's house. In affirming
defendant's conviction, the court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to establish
defendant's constructive possession of the marijuana where defendant owned the property
and marijuana paraphernalia was found in defendant's bedroom and other rooms in the
home. Because the greenhouse in which the marijuana was grown was accessible only
through the house, there was a reasonable inference that defendant not only knew of the
greenhouse and its contents but also exercised dominion and control over the marijuana
growing therein and was responsible for growing the marijuana. The court held that
constructive possession is proved by establishing a connection between the accused and
the drug sufficient to permit an inference that the accused had both the ability and the
intent to exercise dominion or control over it. Id. at 319. The court held that in every
case, the determination that someone has constructive possession of drugs is a factual
determination that turns on the particular circumstances of the case. Further, that among
these circumstances must be facts that permit the inference that the accused intended to
use the drugs as his or her own. Id
Workman asserts that there was little evidence presented to prove that he had the
"ability and the intent to exercise dominion or control" over Armstrong's person in Utah
County and that it is unreasonable to infer that he constructively possessed the car. The
only fact tending to prove Mark's control over Armstrong is that she called him to let him
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know that she would not be bringing the car back to him that evening. (R. 196:19). This
simply is not enough.

C.

The testimony presented showed that every element of the crime charged
occurred in Salt Lake County.
Workman asserts that every element of the crime of theft, by receiving occurred in

Salt Lake County. In State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977), Cauble was charged,
tried, and convicted of theft in Utah County. Cauble sold three trailers owned by his
employer and received a check in payment. He then deposited the check in a bank in Salt
Lake County. Id. at 776. Cauble's authority as a sales representative was limited to
accepting payment, and he was to immediately turn over the payment to the appropriate
personnel. Id. at 778. The court reasoned that when Cauble formed the intent in Utah
County to keep the proceeds from the sale, failed to turn over the check to the appropriate
personnel in Utah County, and failed to notify the company that a sale had occurred in
Utah County that the elements of the offense were well established by his conduct, and
therefore met the statutory requirement. The court held that the conduct of appellant that
constituted the elements of the offense was found to have occurred to a "substantial
degree" in Utah County; therefore, the venue was properly laid in Utah County. Id at
779.
Workman asserts that venue for this trial was improperly laid in Utah County,
because the evidence presented in this case shows that for every element of the offense,
the conduct of the appellant was found to have occurred to a "substantial degree" in Salt
Lake County. The relevant elements of the offense of theft by receiving stolen property
are: (1) receiving, retaining, or disposing of an automobile, and (2) knowing that the
property had been stolen, or (3) believing that the property probably had been stolen, and
12

(4) intending to deprive the owner thereof. The testimony presented showed that
Workman received the car in Salt Lake County, (R. 196: 14), retained possession of the
car in Salt Lake County, (R. 196: 13), and disposed of the car in Salt Lake County (R.
196: 13, 18). In addition, the knowledge or belief that the car was stolen and the intent to
deprive the owner of the property occurred at the time of purchase, which occurred in Salt
Lake County. (R. 196: 18).

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Workman asks that this court reverse the trial court's ruling on the motion to
dismiss or in the alternative quash bindover for improper venue, because the evidence
presented in this case shows that he did not have control or constructive possession of the
vehicle in Utah County. Alternatively, Workman asks that this court reverse the trial
court's ruling on the motion because the testimony presented shows that every element of
the crime for which he was charged occurred in Salt Lake County.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of June, 2005.

1/h~iysf
Margaret 1*. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South,
Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 2nd day of June, 2005.
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Theft by deception.
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76-6-408

in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a class or group.
1973
76-6-406. Theft by extortion.
(1) A person is guilty of theft if he obtains or exercises
control over the property of another by extortion and with a
purpose to deprive him thereof
(2) As used in this section, extortion occurs when a person
threatens to:
(a) Cause physical harm in the future to the. person
threatened or to any other person or to property at any
time; or
(b) Subject the person threatened or any other person
to physical confinement or restraint; or
(c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime; or
(d) Accuse any person of a crime or expose him to
hatred, contempt, or ridicule; or
(e) Reveal any information sought to be concealed by
the person threatened; or
(f) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another's legal claim
or defense; or
(g) Take action as an official against anyone or anything, or withhold official action, or cause such action or
withholding; or
(h) Bring about or continue a stzike, boycott, or other
similar collective action to obtain property which is not
demanded or received for the benefit of the group which
the actor purports to represent; or
(i) Do any other act which would not in itself substantially benefit him but which would harm substantially
any other person with respect to t h a t person's health,
safety, business, calling, career, financial condition, reputation, or personal relationships.
1973
76-6-407.

Theft of lost, mislaid, or m i s t a k e n l y delivered property.
A person commits theft when:
(1) He obtains property of another which he knows to
have been lost or mislaid, or to have been delivered under
a mistake as to the identity of the recipient or as to the
nature or amount of the property, without taking reasonable measures to return it to the owner: and
(2) He has the purpose to deprive the owner of the
property when he obtains the property or at any time
prior to taking the measures designated in paragraph (1).
1973

76-6-408.

R e c e i v i n g stolen property — D u t i e s of p a w n b r o k e r s [Effective u n t i l J a n u a r y 1, 2005].
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing t h a t it has been
stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who
conceals, sells, withliolds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection CI) is
presumed in the case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property
stolen on a separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year
preceding the receiving offense charged;
(c) being a dealer in property of t h e sort received,
retained, or disposed, acquires it for a consideration
which he knows is far below its reasonable value; or
(d) if the value given for the property exceeds $20, is a
pawnbroker or person who has or operates a business
dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise
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tative of a pawnbroker or person who buys, receives, or
obtains property and fails to require the seller or- person
delivering the property to:
f i» certify in writing, that he has the legal rights to
sell the property:
(ii» provide a legible print, preferably the right
thumb, at the bottom of the certificate nexi to his
signature: and
(hi) provide at least one other positive form of
picture id en tifi ca ti on.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property and every agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply
with the requirements of Subsection (2)(d) shall be presumed
to have bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it
to have been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption
may be rebutted by proof.
(4.) When, in a prosecution under this section, it appears
from the evidence t h a t the defendant was a pawnbroker or a
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecting
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, or was
an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker or
person, that the defendant, bought, received, concealed, or
withheld the property without obtaining the information required in Subsection (2Vd), then the burden shall be upon the
defendant to show t h a t the property bought, received, or
obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2}(d), (3), and (4) do not apply to scrap
metal processors as defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6.) As used in this section:
(a) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, or
title or lending on the security of the property:
(b) "Dealer" means a person in the business of bu}dng
or selling goods.
1993
R e c e i v i n g s t o l e n property — D u t i e s of
p a w n b r o k e r s [Effective J a n u a r y 1, 2005].
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another knowing that it h a s been
stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or who
conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property from the owner, knowing the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of it.
(2) The knowledge or belief required for Subsection (1) is
presumed in the case of an actor who:
(a) is found in possession or control of other property
stolen on a separate occasion;
(b) has received other stolen property within the year
preceding the receiving offense charged; or
(c) is a pawnbroker or person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand
merchandise or personal property, or an agent, employee,
or representative of a pawnbroker or person who buys,
receives, or obtains property and fails to require the seller
or person delivering the property to:
(i) certify, in writing, t h a t he h a s the legal rights to
sell the property;
(ii) provide a legible print, preferably the right
thumb, at the bottom of the certificate next to his
signature; and
(hi) provide at least one positive form of identification.
(3) Every pawnbroker or person who has or operates a
business dealing in or collecting used or secondhand merchandise or personal property, and every agent, employee, or
representative of a pawnbroker or person who fails to comply
with the requirements of Subsection (2)(c) is presumed to have
bought, received, or obtained the property knowing it to have
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been stolen or unlawfully obtained. This presumption m av »
rebutted by proof.
' e
i'4) When, in a prosecution under this section, it apnea,
from the evidence t h a t the defendant was a pawnbroker 0r~
person who has or operates a business dealing in or collecti °
used or secondhand merchandise or personal property or w
an agent, employee, or representative of a pawnbroker
person, that the defendant, bought, received, concealed
withheld the property without obtaining the information r
quired in Subsection (2)fdi, then the burden shall be uponth
defendant to show that the property bought, received
obtained was not stolen.
(5) Subsections (2)(ci, (3), and (4) do not apply to serai
metal processors as defined in Section 76-10-901.
(6) As used m this section:
(a) "Dealer" means a person in the business of buyim
or selling goods.
(b) "Pawnbroker" means a person who:
(i) loans money on deposit of personal property, 0
deals in the purchase, exchange, or possession 0
personal property on condition of selling the sam
property back again to the pledge or depositor;
(ii) loans or advances money on personal propert
by taking chattel mortgage security on t h e propert
and takes or receives the personal property into hi
possession and who sells the unredeemed pledges; c
(iiij receives personal property in exchange fa
money or in trade for other personal property.
(c) "Receives" means acquiring possession, control, c
title or lending on the security of the property.
2W
76-6-409. Theft of s e r v i c e s .
(1.) A person commits theft if he obtains sendees which h
knows are available only for compensation by deceptioi
threat, force, or any other means designed to avoid the di]
payment for them.
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over tt
disposition of services of another, to which he knows he is n<
entitled, he diverts the services to his own benefit or to tl
benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them.
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited t
labor, professional service, public utility and transportatic
services, restaurant, hotel, motel, tourist cabin, roomii
house, and like accommodations, the supplying of equipmeE
tools, vehicles, or trailers for temporary use, telephone 1
telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhil
tions, sporting events, or other events for which a charge
made.
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricil
water, sewer, or cable television services, only if the servio
are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception n
described in Section 76-6-409.3.
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone servic
onty if the services are obtained by threat, force, or a form
deception not described in Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76409.9.
is
76-6-409.1. D e v i c e s for theft of s e r v i c e s — Seizure ai
d e s t r u c t i o n — Civil a c t i o n s for d a m a g e s .
(1) A person may not knowingly:
(a) make or possess an3^ instrument, apparatus, equi
ment, or device for the use of, or for the purpose
committing or attempting to commit theft under Secti
76-6-409 or 76-6-409.3; or
(b) sell, offer to sell, advertise, give, transport, or ol
erwise transfer to another any information, instrunie:
apparatus, equipment, or device, or any informant
plan, or instruction for obtaining, making, or assembli
the same, with intent t h a t it be used, or caused to be us<
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)y his own conduct or that of another for which he is
accountable, if:
a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly
thin the state;
b' the conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt
commit an offense within the state;
(c) the conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiry to commit an offense within the state and an act in
rtherance of the conspiracy occurs in the state: or
(d) the conduct within the state constitutes an attempt,
licitation, or conspiracy to commit in another jurisdicm an offense under the laws of both this state and the
her jurisdiction.
An offense is committed partly within this state if either
ndnct which is any element of the offense, or the result
is an element, occurs within this state.
In homicide offenses, the "result" is either t h e physical
:t which causes death or the death itself.
(a) If the body of a homicide victim is found within the
tate, the death shall be presumed to have occurred
dthin the state.
(b) If jurisdiction is based on this presumption, this
tate retains jurisdiction unless the defendant proves by
lear and convincing evidence that:
(i) the result of the homicide did not occur in this
state: and
iii.) the defendant did not engage in any conduct in
this state which is any element of the offense.
An offense which is based on an omission to perform a
imposed by the law of this state is committed within the
regardless of the location of the offender at the time of
•mission.
la) If no jurisdictional issue is raised, the pleadings are
sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
f b) The defendant may challenge jurisdiction by filing a
motion before trial stating which facts exist t h a t deprive
the state of jurisdiction.
(c) The burden is upon the state to initially establish
jurisdiction over the offense by a preponderance of the
evidence by showing under the provisions of Subsections
(1) through (4) that the offense was committed either
wholly or partly within the borders of the state.
(d> If after the prosecution has met its burden of proof
under Subsection (5)(.c) the defendant claims t h a t the
state is deprived of jurisdiction or may not exercise
jurisdiction, the burden is upon the defendant to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) any facts claimed: and
di) why those facts deprive the state of jurisdiction.
5) Facts that deprive the state of jurisdiction or prohibit
state from exercising jurisdiction include the fact t h a t the:
(a.) defendant is serving in a position that is entitled to
diplomatic immunity from prosecution and t h a t the defendant's country has not waived that diplomatic immunity;
(
b) defendant is a member of the armed forces of
another country and that the crime that he is alleged to
have committed is one that due to an international
agreement, such as a status of forces agreement between
his country and the United States, cedes the exercise of
jurisdiction over him for that offense to his country;
ic) defendant is an enrolled member of an Indian tribe,
as defined in Section 9-9-101, and that the Indian tribe
has a legal status with the United States or the state that
vests jurisdiction in either tribal or federal courts for
certain offenses committed within the exterior boundaries
of a tribal reservation, and that the facts establish t h a t
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the crime is one that vests jurisdiction in tribal or federal
court; or
I'd) offense occurred on land that is exclusively within
federal jurisdiction.
(71 (a) The Legislature finds that identity fraud under
Chapter 6, Part 11, Identity Fraud Act, involves the use of
persona] identifying information which is uniquely personal to the consumer or business victim of that identity
fraud and which information is considered to be in lawful
possession of the consumer or business victim wherever
the consumer or business victim currently resides or is
found.
(b) For purposes of Subsection (l)(aj. an offense which
is based on a violation of Chapter 6, Part 11, Identity
Fraud Act, is committed partly within this state, regardless of the location of the offender at the time of the
offense, if the victim of the identity fraud resides or is
found in this state.
(8.) The judge shall determine jurisdiction.
2004
76-1-202. Venue of actions.
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or
precinct where the offense is alleged to have been committed.
In determining the proper place of trial, the following provisions shall apply:
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside
the state is consummated within this state, the offender
shall be tried in the county where the offense is consummated.
(b.) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or
results that constitute elements, whether the conduct or
result constituting elements is in itself unlawful, shall
occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense may be
held in any of the counties concerned.
i c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of
another is located in one county and his victim is located
in another county at the time of t h e commission of the
offense, trial may be held in either county.
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and
death ensues in another county, the offender may be tried
in either county.
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be
tried in any county in which any act that is an element of
the offense, including the agreement in conspiracy, is
committed.
ff) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets,
agrees, or attempts to aid another in the planning or
commission of an offense in another county, he may be
tried for the offense in either county.
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and
it cannot be readily determined in which county or district
the offense occurred, the following provisions shall be
applicable:
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, watercraft, or aircraft passing
within this state, the offender may be tried in any
county through which such railroad car, vehicle,
watercraft, or aircraft has passed.
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body "of
water bordering on or within this state, the offender
may be tried in any county adjacent to such body of
water. The words ''body of water" shall include but
not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir,
whether natural or man-made.
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in
any county in which he exerts control over the property affected.
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the
boundary of two or more counties, trial of the offense
may be held in any of such counties.
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(v.! For any other offense, trial may be held in the
county in which the defendant resides, or, if he has no
fixed residence, in the county in which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited.
i'h) A person who commits an offense based on Chapter
6, Part 11, Identity Fraud Act, may be tried in the county:
li> where the victim's personal identifying information was obtained:
(ii.) where the defendant used or attempted to use
the personally identifying information;
(hi) where the victim of the identity fraud resides
oi" is found; or
(iv) if multiple offenses of identity fraud occur in
multiple jurisdictions, in any county where the victim's identity was used or obtained, or where the
victim resides or is found.
(2.) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a
defendant unless made before trial.
2004
PARTS
LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
76-1-301.

Offenses for w h i c h p r o s e c u t i o n m a y be comm e n c e d at a n y time.
A prosecution for a capital felony, aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, child abuse homicide which is a second
degree felon}; aggravated kidnapping, or child kidnapping
may be commenced at any time.
2002
76-1-301.5. Time l i m i t a t i o n s for p r o s e c u t i o n of m i s u s ing p u b l i c m o n i e s , falsification or alteration
of g o v e r n m e n t records, and bribery.
( D A prosecution for misusing public monies, falsification
or alteration of government records, or for a bribery offense
shall be commenced within two years after facts constituting
the offense have been reported to a prosecutor having responsibility and jurisdiction to prosecute the offense.
(2) This section does not shorten the limitation of actions
under Section 76-1-302 or Subsection 76-1-303(3).
2002
76-1-302.

Time l i m i t a t i o n s for p r o s e c u t i o n of offenses
— P r o v i s i o n s if DNA e v i d e n c e w o u l d identify
the d e f e n d a n t — C o m m e n c e m e n t of prosecution.
(1) Except as otherwise provided, a prosecution for:
(a) a felony or negligent homicide shall be commenced
within four years after it is committed;
(b) a misdemeanor other than negligent homicide shall
be commenced within two 3'ears after it is committed; and
(c) any infraction shall be commenced within one year
after it is committed.
(2) (a) A prosecution for the offenses listed in Subsections
76-3-203.5(l)(c)(i)(A) through (P) may be commenced at
any time if the identity of the person who committed the
crime is unknown but DNA evidence is collected t h a t
would identify the person at a later date.
(b) Subsection (2)(a) does not apply if the statute of
limitations on a crime has run as of May 5, 2003, and no
charges have been filed.
(3) If the statute of limitations would have run but for the
provisions of Subsection (2) and identification of a perpetrator
is made through DNA, a prosecution shall be commenced
within one year of the discovery of the identity of the perpetrator.
(4) A prosecution is commenced upon the finding and filing
of an indictment by a grand jury or upon the filing of a
complaint or information.
2003

76-1-303.

Time l i m i t a t i o n s for fraud or breach of f
ciary obligation and m i s c o n d u c t of p u
officer or e m p l o y e e .
(1) If the period prescribed 111 Section 76-1-302 has ex pi
a prosecution may be commenced for any offense a matt
element of which is either fraud or a breach of fiduc
obligation within one year after discovery of the offense b
aggrieved party or by a person who has a legal duti
represent an aggrieved party and who is himself not a part
the offense.
(2.) Subsection (1) may not extend the period of limitatio:
provided in Section 76-1-302 by more than three years.
(3) If the period prescribed in Section 76-1-301.5 or 7
302 has expired, a prosecution may be commenced for:
(a) any offense based upon misconduct in office h
public officer or public employee:
(i) at any time during which the defendant hole
public office or during the period of his public emp.
ment; or
(ii.) within two years after termination of del
dant's public office or public employment.
(b) Except as provided in Section 76-1-301.5. Subs
tion (3.) shall not extend the period of limitation otherw
applicable by more than three years.
1
76-1-303.5. S e x u a l offense a g a i n s t a child.
If the period prescribed in Subsection 76-1-302(1) has
pired, a prosecution may nevertheless be commenced for rc
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, sexi
abuse of a child, or aggravated sexual abuse of a child wit!
four years after the report of the offense to a law enforceme
agency.
u
i
76-1-304. D e f e n d a n t out of state — P l e a h e l d invalid
New prosecutions.
(1) The period of limitation does not run against a
defendant during any period of time in which the defendant
out of the state following the commission of an offense.
(2) If the defendant has entered into a plea agreement wi
the prosecution and later successfully moves to invalidate I
conviction, the period of limitation is suspended from the til
of the entry of the plea pursuant to the plea agreement un'
the time at which the conviction is determined to be mvali
and t h a t determination becomes final.
(3) For purposes of this section, "final" means:
(a) all appeals have been exhausted:
(b) no judicial review is pending; and
(c) no application for judicial review is pending. . 4
(4) When t h e period of limitation is suspended p u r s u a n t
Subsection (2), the suspension includes any charges to whic
the defendant pleaded guilty p u r s u a n t to a plea agreemen
charges which were dismissed as a result of a plea agreemen
as well as any known charges which were not barred at tl
time of entry of the plea.
(5) Notwithstanding any other limitation, a prosecutic
may be commenced for charges described in Subsection k
within one year after a plea entered pursuant to a pi*
agreement h a s been determined to be invalid, and t h a t dete
mination becomes
final.
w
76-1-305.

L e s s e r i n c l u d e d offense for w h i c h period <
l i m i t a t i o n s has r u n .
Whenever a defendant is charged with an offense for whif
the period of limitations has not run and the defendant shoig
be found guilty of a lesser offense for which the period
limitations has run, the finding of the lesser and include
offense against which the statute of limitations has run she
not be a bar to punishment for the lesser offense.
1-
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
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RULING RE: MOTION TO DISMISS
OR QUASH BINDOVER
Case #001400742

vs.

Judge Fred D. Howard

MARK DUANE WORKMAN,
Defendant.

Division 2

The above-entitled matter having come before the Court on Defendant' s Motion to Dismiss
for Improper Venue, or in the Alternative, Motion to Quash Bindover Order; and the Court having
carefully considered the Motions and PlaintifP s Responses thereto; and the Court being fully advised
in the premises, and good cause appearing, it now make the following Ruling:
Noting the facts relative to the incident in question and submitted authorities; the Court is
persuaded by Plaintiffs arguments and authorities which the Court adopts and incorporates in this
Ruling. Defendant's Motions, therefore, are respectfully denied.

Dated this 2 - /

day of May 2003.

BY THE COURT:
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district Court\Judge
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

)

CASE NUMBER: 001400742

1

MOTION DISMISS FOR
IMPROPER VENUE or in the
alternative MOTION TO
QUASH BINDOVER ORDER

vs.

;1

MARK WORKMAN,

]
Hon. Fred D. Howard

Defendant.

]

Comes Now, Defendant, Mark Workman, by and through his
attorney of record, Thomas H. Means, and pursuant to the 6th
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Article I §12
of the Constitution of Utah and §76-1-202, Utah Code, who hereby
respectfully moves for this Court's Order that this matter be
-dismissed for reason of lack of venue in Utah County, or in the
alternative that this Court quash the Bindover Order previously
issued after the preliminary examination conducted in this
matter, also for the reason that venue is not proper in Utah
County.

FACTS
Defendant asserts that the facts relevant to this
motion are as follows:
1.

Defendant is charged by the Utah County Attorney

with THEFT BY RECEIVING STOLEN PROPERTY, a Second Degree Felony,
alleging that Defendant, on or about 7 January, 2000, received,
retained, or disposed of an automobile belonging to another,
knowing that the property had been stolen, or believing that the
property probably had been stolen, or that he concealed, sold, or
withheld the property or that he aided in concealing, selling, or
withholding the property also knowing that the property had been
stolen or believing that the property probably had been stolen,
intending to deprive the owner thereof.
2.

At the time of the alleged offense, the filing of

the Information, the preliminary examination, and presently
Defendant has and does reside in Salt Lake County.
3.

At the preliminary examination held in this matter,

Detective Todd Mallinson testified for the State substantially as
follows (a transcript of the preliminary examination is in the
file of this matter):

2

a.

Detective Mallinson first observed a car in

Orem City, Utah County at a 7-11 and eventually stopped the car
on 1-15 in Utah; it was being driven by Holly Armstrong; through
a check with dispatch the car was reported stolen; Tr. 7:17
through 13:2.
b.

On information gained from the driver,

Detective Mallinson called Defendant by telephone, presumably at
his residence in Murray, Salt Lake County; during said call
Defendant allegedly made statements that he had been in
possession of the car in Salt Lake County and had loaned the car
to Holly Armstrong in Salt Lake County; Tr. 13:3 through 14:13.
c.

On cross examination, Detective Mallinson

indicated that Ms. Armstrong told him she had picked up the car
at Defendant's residence in Salt Lake County at about 5:00pm the
day before; that she had gone to a party and had stopped at a 711 where the officer had first seen her to call Defendant to tell
him she didn't want to go back to Salt lake County that she
wanted to keep the car.

3

LAW
1.

The 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United

States(made applicable to State actions by the 14th Amendment)
provides that the Defendant "shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law[.]"
2.

Article I, §12 of the Utah Constitution provides

that the Defendant shall "have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is
alleged to have been committed[.]"
3.

To implement these two constitutional guarantees

§76-1-202 provides certain rules of venue. Sub-section 76-1202(1)(b) provides that when elements of the offense occur in
more than one county trial may be held in either county.
Subsection 76-1-202(g)(iii) is more particular to the crime of
theft and provides that "[a] person who commits theft may be
tried in any county in which he exerts control over the property
affected."

4

ARGUMENT
Taken in the light most favorable to the State the
evidence admitted at the preliminary examination established that
Defendant may have retained and disposed of the automobile in
Salt Lake County. No evidence was admitted that established that
the Defendant did so in Utah County or aided another in doing so.
While the evidence established that Ms. Armstrong retained the
vehicle within Utah County, her actions cannot be attributed to
the Defendant.
First, the evidence established that Defendant
completed any retention or disposing of the car in Salt Lake
County on the 6th of January. At the time that possession of the
vehicle was transferred from the Defendant to Ms. Armstrong on
the evening of the 6th, Defendant ceased to retain the vehicle
and had completed the act of disposing of the vehicle, all within
Salt Lake County. If after disposing of the vehicle to Ms.
Armstrong it can be said that Defendant also continued to retain
the vehicle, the term "dispose" would have no meaning in the
statute. This would violate the rule of statutory construction
that all terms of a statute are presumed to have been used
advisedly by the legislature. See Board

5

of Education

of

Granite

School

District

v Salt

lake

County,

659 P.2d 1030 1035 (Utah,

1983). Therefore, all of the elements of theft by receiving that
have been alleged against Defendant occurred in Salt Lake County,
only.
The evidence established that Ms. Armstrong's decisions
to commit some elements of her own retention of the vehicle in
Utah County were her independent actions based on her own
independent decisions, not aided encouraged or directed by the
Defendant. No evidence established that Defendant directed or
even knew that Ms. Armstrong would bring the vehicle into Utah
County. Defendant was not present with the car in Utah County and
had no nexus to the car in Utah County. Ms. Armstrong's retention
was therefore her own separate act.
Second, the more specific section of the venue statute
(76-1-202(g) (iii)) directs that the trial of the charges against
Defendant be held where "he exerts control over the property
affected." An excepted precept of statutory construction is that
specific provisions of law take precedent over more general

provisions. Southern
Lands

and Forestry,

Utah Wilderness

Alliance

v Board of

State

830 P.2d 233, 235 (Utah, 1992). Consequently,

sub-section (1)(g)(iii) which is specific to crimes of theft must

6

take precedence over sub-section (1)(b) which is general in
application. As stated above, the evidence presented at the
preliminary examination established only that Defendant exerted
control over the vehicle in Salt Lake County at which place he
handed over control to Ms. Armstrong. In contrast, no evidence
established that Defendant aided Ms. Armstrong in the control she
independently exerted over the car in Utah County, such as
directions to her to take the car to Utah County, agreeing with
her that she could take the car to Utah County, being with her
while she took the car to Utah County, jointly controlling the
car with her in Utah County.
CONCLUSION
The State may have established that Defendant completed
an act of receiving, retaining, or disposing of the stolen car in
Salt lake County. The State did not present any evidence from
which the magistrate could have concluded that Defendant
personally received, retained, or disposed of the car in Utah
County. Neither did the State establish probable cause to
conclude that Defendant aided Ms. Armstrong in her independent
act of retaining the car in Utah County first because there was
no evidence to establish that Defendant had knowledge of or

7

encouraged her in bringing the car to Utah County. And, second,
and more importantly, the specific requirement that Defendant
exerted control over the car in Utah County was not established
because State established that Defendant had already disposed of
the car (therefore culminating his control over the car) in Salt
Lake County.
Therefore Defendant moves for this Court's order that
this matter be dismissed for lack of venue to try this Defendant
in Utah County or alternatively, that this Court quash the
Bindover order of the magistrate also for the reason that the
State failed to establish at the preliminary examination that
Defendant's alleged crime occurred in Utah County.
Dated this

//[Vfciay of April, 2003.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING
I hereby certify that on the

- */

day of April, 2003,

I hand-delivered or mailed, with postage pre-paid, a copy of the
foregoing to the following:
Kay Bryson
Utah County Attorney
100 East Center
Suite 2100
Provo, Utah, 84601
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KAY BRYSON #0473
Utah County Attorney
CURTIS L. LARSON #6598
Deputy Utah County Attorney
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, UT 84606
(801) 370-8026

IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
DISMISS OR QUASH BIND-OVER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 001400742

MARK WORKMAN

JUDGE FRED D. HOWARD

Defendant(s).

COMES NOW PLAINTIFF, by and through its counsel of record
Curtis L. Larson, and responds to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss,
or in the alternative, Quash the Bind-Over as follows:

PERTINENT FACTS
1.

State stipulates to the facts presented by the defendant in
his motion that are based upon the record of the Preliminary
Hearing.

2.

That State submits the following additions to the facts
which were brought forward at the Preliminary Hearing:
a.

Defendant "loaned" the car to Armstrong.

b.

Defendant received a call from Armstrong, in Utah

1

>u

County, detailing her desire not to return the car to
him that night, but keep it in Utah County.
c.

It is unsure where the defendant was at the time of
this call: He could have been in Salt Lake, or Utah
County.

d.

That the defendant received a call from the officer,
who was in Utah County with the vehicle, and was asked
questions regarding the vehicle: Again it was unknown
at the time of the call where the defendant was as he
was on a cellphone.

e.

That the defendant declared his ownership of the
vehicle to the officer, while it was sitting, in police
custody, in Utah County.

f.

That the title defendant claimed to the vehicle, and
located in the vehicle, was to a completely different
vehicle.

g.

That the defendant paid $900 down, on a $3600 purchase
price for a vehicle that was valued at $9,282.00.

VENUE ARGUMENT
State7 s counsel has reviewed his arguments made at the
conclusion of the Preliminary Hearing (Tr. 21:6 - 22:19, and 24:9
~ 25:14), and, believing them to be well-found, and articulate,
re-iterates them through their incorporation into this response.
2

The Statute in question in defendant's motion is 76-1-202.
It states in pertinent part:
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district,
or precinct where the offense is alleged to have been
committed. In determining the proper place of trial, the
following provisions shall apply: . . .
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or
results that constitute elements, whether the conduct or
result constituting elements is in itself unlawful, shall
occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense may be
held in any of the counties concerned. . . .
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it
cannot be readily determined in which county or district the
offense occurred, the following provisions shall be
applicable: . . . (iii) A person who commits theft may be
tried in any county in which he exerts control over the
property affected.
In State

v. Mitchell,

3 Utah 2d 70, 278 P.2d 618 (1955), the

court held that venue was not an element of the offense of
murder, so it was sufficient that proof of venue be by a
"preponderance of the evidence."

This is very low standard, and

is demonstrated in State

89 Utah 437, 57 P2d 750 (1936).

In Green,

v Green,

the court found prima

facia

proof of proper venue when

a witness simply had the "impression" that a certain place was in
"Salt Lake County."
In State

v. Cauble,

563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977), the court

directed that in determining the proper place of trial, where

or more counties
trial

are involved,

the venue statute

may be held in any of the counties

constitutes

the elements

of the offense
3

provides

in which the
charged.

that

conduct

two

In Cauble,

the defendant obtained possession of a check in a

business transaction, and formulated the intent to deprive the
owner thereof, in Utah County.

He then took the check to Salt

Lake County and deposited it in a bank account.
charged and tried in Utah County.

Defendant was

On appeal the defendant argued

that Utah County was not the proper venue, as the actual
unauthorized control of the check was in Salt Lake County.

The

court held:
The elements of theft under the Utah Code are that appellant
(1) obtained or exercised unauthorized control over
another's property, and (2) that he had a purpose to deprive
the owner of the property. . . .
The most difficult question arises as to when appellant's
control over the money became unauthorized -- when he
received the check into his possession at the time the sale
was made in Utah County, or when he deposited the check into
his personal account at Tracy-Collins Bank in Salt Lake
County. Appellant claims that he was authorized to accept
money on behalf of Western Leisure and, therefore, no crime
could have occurred until the property was actually
converted to his own use at the Salt Lake bank. The record
does not support this contention. . . .
It seems clear that when appellant formed the intent in Utah
County to keep the proceeds from the Wheelwright sale; when
he failed to deliver the check to Mrs. Peterson; and,
further, when he failed to notify the company that a sale
had even been made, that the elements of the offense were
well established by his conduct at that point in time, and
therefore meet the statutory requirement. . . .
Appellant has contended that the unlawful conduct did not
occur until the bank in Salt Lake City accepted the check
from him. Banking practices can be used as one measure to
determine when and where the crime was technically
committed, and we find authority to support the view that
since a bank does not recognize a transaction as complete
until final payment from the originating bank is cleared, an
4

offense of embezzlement is begun in the county where the
check is drawn and completed in the county where it is
ultimately paid. In the instant case, the check in question
originated in Utah County and was ultimately paid there.
Regardless of the standard applied herein, the conduct of
appellant which constitutes the elements of the offense is
found to have occurred to a substantial degree in Utah
County. We find that venue was properly laid in Utah County.
. . . [Footnotes and Citations omitted.]
Similar to the circumstances in Cauble,

presumably, the

defendant took possession of the vehicle, and formed the intent
to permanently deprive the owner thereof on Salt Lake County.

He

then retained possession of that stolen vehicle in Utah County by
his exercising authority over it in a telephone conversation with
Holly Armstrong, and the Officer.

He indicated he was the owner

of the vehicle, and had loaned it to Armstrong.

As he loaned the

car to Armstrong, he exerted possessory rights to it in Utah
County, or wherever else she went, as he expected her to bring it
back, which is evidenced by the fact that she would call him from
Utha County to gain an extension of the time for return. To our
knowledge, Armstrong was never encouraged to return the vehicle
to the rightful owner, but only to the person whom she recognized
as such—which was the defendant.
Defendant argues the need for defendant's "actual physical
control" of the vehicle: That "he" had to be in the vehicle in
Utah County at the time of the stop.

State disagrees and has

previously in argument indicated that the courts readily accept
the concept of "constructive possession."
5

State

v Lyman,

1999 UT

79.

State renews the applicability of this argument.
Applying the "preponderance" standard as espoused in

Mitchell,

supra.,

the State has met its burden of showing that

venue in this matter is correct with the 4th District Court.
Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss based upon improper
venue should be denied.

QUASH BIND-OVER ARGUMENT
The defendant argues that as the State filed to provide a
showing of proper venue, the bind-over should be dismissed.

He

argues it in the alternative, however the state does not see it
as an argument in the alternative as it is part and parcel of
venue argument.

Should the Court decide that venue was

established, than the bind-over was, and remains, correct, and
this matter should go further to trial.
Similar to requirement for establishing venue, the courts
have held that the standard for bind-over is a "preponderance" of
the evidence, as viewed in light of all inferences being drawn in
favor of the State.

Most recently, the Supreme Court of Utah

decided the case of State

v Clark,

2001 UT 9.

In that case the

court delineated the standard of proof required at a preliminary
hearing.

It stated:

[W]e hold that the quantum of evidence necessary to support
a bind-over is less than that necessary to survive a
directed verdict motion. Specifically, we see no principled
basis for attempting to maintain a distinction between the
6

arrest warrant probable cause standard and the preliminary
hearing probable cause standard. Our efforts to articulate
a standard that is more rigorous than the arrest warrant
standard and is still lower that a preponderance of the
evidence standard have only resulted in confusion.
Therefore, at both the arrest warrant and the preliminary
hearing stages, the prosecution must present sufficient
evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense was
committed and that the defendant committed it. [Citation and
footnote omitted.] This "reasonable belief" standard has the
advantage of being more easily understood while still
allowing the magistrates to fulfill the primary purpose of
the preliminary hearing, "ferreting out . . . groundless and
improvident prosecutions." [Citation omitted.] Clark at 116.
In State

v Pledger,

896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995), the Supreme

Court of Utah instructed:
Preliminary hearings are adversarial proceedings in which
the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to
establish that "the crime charged has been committed and
that the defendant has committed it." Utah R. Crim. P.
7(h) (2). "The prosecution is not required to introduce
enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the trier of
fact." Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783. In making a determination
as to probable cause, the magistrate should view the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and
resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution. People
v. District Court, 779 P.2d 385, 388 (Colo. 1989) (en banc);
State v. Starks, 249 Kan. 516, 820 P.2d 1243, 1246 (Kan.
1991); see also Diaz v. State, 728 P.2d 503, 510 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1986) ("There is a presumption that the State
will strengthen its evidence at trial."). Moreover, "unless
the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable
inference to prove some issue which supports the
[prosecution's] claim," the magistrate should bind the
defendant over for trial. Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729
(Utah 1983) (setting out standard for directed verdict in
civil case). Pledger,
896 P.2d at 1229. [Emphasis added.]
In State

v Talbot,

356 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1998) the

Utah State Supreme Court directed:
7

[P]ertinent to the standard for establishing probable
cause at a preliminary hearing [are]: (i) the quantum
of the evidence required to establish probable cause;
(ii) the extent of the magistrate's freedom to review
the credibility of evidence presented at the hearing;
and (iii) the limitations on a magistrate's ability to
choose between credible but conflicting evidence.
Talbot,
356 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.
Continuing, the court re-affirmed:
This is not a trial on the merits, only a gateway to
the finder of fact. Therefore, "the magistrate should
view the evidence in a light most favorable to the
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the
prosecution.77 Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229. Talbot,
356
Utah Adv. Rep. at 15.
In this matter, the statute in play is Section 76-6-408(1),
Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, which details the elements
of the offense:
(1) A person commits theft if he receives, retains, or
disposes of the property of another knowing that it has been
stolen, or believing that it probably has been stolen, or
who conceals, sells, withholds or aids in concealing,
selling, or withholding the property from the owner, knowing
the property to be stolen, intending to deprive the owner of
it.
In this case, the evidence introduced at Preliminary Hearing
show that the defendant committed the alleged crime of Receiving
Stolen Property in Utah County.

Based upon the evidence in this

matter, the jury can appropriately draw a conclusion that the
defendant committed the crime charged.
In the preliminary hearing, the magistrate is only making a
limited determination that probable cause exists which warrants
submission of the case to the trier of fact. According the
8

supreme court, this is "a reasonable belief that an offense was
committed and that the defendant committed it." Clark
And, "[t]his probable cause standard

A

at 116.

is lower, even, than a

preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to civil
cases/" Talbot,

356 Utah Adv. Rep. at 15, Anderson,

612 P2d at

783. "[UJnless the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of
reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the
[prosecution's] claim," the magistrate should bind the defendant
over for trial. Pledger,
Further

supra, quoting, Cruz

v Montoya,

supra.

,T

[t]he prosecution is not required to introduce

enough evidence to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt, but must present a quantum of evidence
sufficient to warrant submission of the case to the trier of

fact." State

v Anderson,

supra.

The state maintains it has presented the quantum of
evidence necessary to satisfy it's burden of proof at a
Preliminary Hearing to establish that the crime charge was
committed, and that the defendant committed it.

CONCLUSION
The statute in issue makes this court the proper venue for
this offense.

The fact that it could have been brought in Salt

Lake County does not defeat the venue of this court.

The State

has provided the sufficient preponderance of evidence necessary
9

for the bind-over order.
Plaintiff requests the court deny Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, or in the alternative, Quash of Bind-Over Order, for the
foregoing reasons.

is

Respectfully submitted this

1 ?/j^day of
ry

day o f y^^j^

^f^L

Curtis L. Larson
Deputy Utah County Attorney
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2003.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I served a true and correct copy of this
Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Quash Bind-Over, via
US/Inter-Office, Mail, this
H/*V
day of £*/)(£-£
, 2003, on
Mr. Tom Means
PD Office
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